THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER,
JUNE 1883.

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.
THE maxim actwo personalis moritur cum persona, as a general
principle, is not correct-it is confined generally to those cases which
arise ex delicto, and not ex contractu, and even then, as we shall
show, is subject to many restrictions, some the work of courts,
some the work of legislators. There are actions ex contractu
which do not survive, and there are actions ex delieto which do
survive: Stebbins v. Palmer, 1 Pick. 71; Lattimore v. Simmons,
t3 S. & R. 183. The -words "personal action" are misleading,
for the maxim was never held to extend to actions arising upon
contracts for the payment of money or for the performance of duties
where property is in question, but was from the first confined to
actions for injury to the person or character: Settler v. Barnett,
8 Port. 181. It will indeed be found that whether or not a cause
of action survives does not depend on the form of the remedywhether it is on a tort or contract-but rather whether the damage
affects the estate of the sufferer or is a mere personal injury.
The distinction seems to be between causes of action which affect
the estate, and those which affect the person only; the former
survive for or against the executor, the latter die with the person:
Stebbins v. Palmer, 1 Pick. 71.
The ancient strictness of the ancient maxim has been constantly
giving way before a more enlightened civilization, and a more
full and perfect development of the principles of natural justice.
Judicial expositions of the statutes, which have been passed concerning the survivorship of actions, and causes of action, seem to
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have been made in the same liberal spirit which led to their enactment: Roofer v. Graham, 45 Me. 213. Thus a statute which
permitted actions of trespass on the case to be prosecuted or defended
by an administrator or executor was held to apply to a case which
had been commenced before the statute went into effect: Id. It
has indeed been said by one court that at the hands of statute or
judicial construction the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is itself dead, or has lost so much of its vitality as to be of
very little use: Peebles v. North CarolinaRailroad Co., 63 N. 0.
238.
What actions do and do not survive.-At common law, as has
been said, no actions for injury to the person survive the death of
the person receiving them. If either the plaintiff or the defendant should die before verdict, any existing action brought to
recover for such injury would abate ; and if none had been brought
by the party injured, none could be commenced by his personal
representative. But as to such personal actions as are founded
upon any obligation, contract, debt, covenant or other duty, the
general rule has been established from the earliest times that the
right of action on which the testator or intestate might have sued
in his lifetime survives his death and is transmitted to his executor
.or administrator: Williams on Executors 786. Therefore, an executor or administrator may maintain an action to recover debts of
every description due to the deceased, whether debts of record, specialties or simple contracts: Id. On the other hand, it was equally
a principle of the common law that if an injury was done to the
person or property of another for which damages only could be
recovered in satisfacti6n, the action died with the person to whom
or by whom the wrong was done. Trespass, trover, false imprisonment, assault and battery, slander, aeceit, diverting a watercourse,
obstructing lights, escape, and many other torts were cases where,
at common law, the maxim aetio personalis rnoriturcum persona
applied: Williams on Executors 790. But the statute of 4 Edw.
III., c. 7, called the statute de bonis asportatis in vita testatoris,
restricted the ancient maxim very much. Reciting that in times
past executors have not had actions for a trespass done to their testators as of the goods and chattels of the said testators carried
away in their life, and so such trespassers remained unpunished,
it enacted that executors in such cases should have an action against
the trespassers and recover their damages in like manner as they
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whose executors they be should have had if they were living. This
statute was subsequently extended to the exedutors of executors and
to administrators, and being a remedial statute was construed liberally. As Lord ELLENBOLOUGH said in an early case (Wilson v.
Knubley, 7 East 134)," It is a very ancient statute passed at a period
when no great precision of language prevailed, and the body of the
act does not speak of actions of trespass, though the instance put is
proper for such an action, but it speaks of actions for a trespass done
to the testator's goods, and it enacts that executors in such cases
shall have an action against the trespassers, apparently using the
word trespass as meaning a wrong done generally and the trespassers
as wrongdoers." The statute was, therefore, construed to include not
only technical trespasses but all acts by which personal property
was lessened in value. The statute, however, it is to be noted, only
gave the action to executors and did not extend to actions against
them, where as against the person committing the injury the action
died with him: see Coker v. Crozier, 5 Ala. 369. The statutes of
most of the states are broader than the English law, and where the
action survives at all, by virtue of their provisions, it survives
against as well as to the executor: -Potts v. Bale, 8 Mass. 321 ;
Wilbur v. Gilmore, 21 Pick. 250; Towle v. Lovatt, 6 Mass. 394;
Holmes v. Moore, 5 Pick. 257; Mellen v. Baldwin, 4 Mass. 480;
Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Id. 292; Middleton v. Robinson, 1 Bay
58 ; _Nettles v. -?' Oyley, 2 Brev. 27.
Even under the English statute there were cases in which the
executor of a tort feasor might be charged, and this distinction has
been made in several American cases in this way: Where the defendant by a tortious act acquires the property of the plaintiff, as
by cutting his trees and converting them to his own use, or by converting his goods to his own use, the action will survive his death:
but where by the act complained of the defendant acquires no gain,
although the plaintiff may have suffered great loss, the action does
not survive: Cravath v. Plympton, 13 Mass. 454; Nettles v.
D'Oyley, 2 Brev. 27; Vittum v. G-ilman, 48 N. H. 416; ffamblij
v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 876; Arnold v. Lamer, 1 N. 0. Law Rep.
148. This distinction was first made by Mr. Justice MANWOOD,
in a case in Saunders, where he said that in every case where aify
price or value is set upon a thing in which the offence is committed,
if the defendant dies his executor shall be chargeable, but where
the action is for damages only in satisfaction for the injury done,
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then his executor shall not be liable. Lord MANSFIELD, in Ifambly
v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 376, after quoting these words, says: " H ere is
a fundamental distinction, if it is a sort of injury by which the
offender acquires no gain to himself at the expense of the sufferer,
as beating or imprisoning a man, then the person injured has only
a reparation for the delictum in damages to be assessed by a jury.
But where besides the crime property is acquired which benefits the
testator, then an action for the value of the property shall survive
against the executor. So far as the tort goes an executor shall not
be liable, and, therefore, it is that all public and all private causes
die with the offender, and the executor is not chargeable, but as far
as the act of the defendant is beneficial to him, his assets ought to
be answerable, and his executor therefore shall be charged :" see
Seeley v. Slosson, 1 Root 216; United States v. -Daniel,6 How.
11; Cooper v. Crane, 9 N. J. L. 173; Coleman v. Woodworth,
28 Gal. 567.
A Missouri case (Hliggins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 500), affords a good
illustration of this distinction. A woman brought an action against
the administrator of a man to whom she had been married by his
deceit, alleging that he had been previously married and had
another wife living at his death. She claimed to recover the value
of her services while she lived with him as his wife. "If the injury
of the man," said the court, " was a mere tort which resulted to no
benefit to himself, then the action would not survive; but if it can
be shown that the injury resulted in an advantage to him that he
was made richer or his circumstances improved by the work and
labor of the unfortunate plaintiff, then this action will lie. It is
not maintained that for the deceit practised, for the injury to her
person, the plaintiff has any redress against the administrator."
So it was held in Pennsylvania that an action for conspiracy between A. and B. to prevent C. from recovering a debt of A., by
means of A.'s assigning to B. without consideration choses in action,
and thereupon taking the benefit of the insolvent law does not abate
by the plaintiff's death: Penrod v. forrison, 2 P. & W. 126.
But at common law, the following classes of actions, were regarded
as strictly personal actions and did not survive.
'Actions of assault and battery: Harrison v. Mifoseley, 31 Tex.
608; Gibbs v. Belcher, 30 Id. 79; Miller v. Umbehower, 10 S. &
R. 311; Kimbrough v. Mitlell, 1 Head 539; to recover a penalty
given by statute: Watson v. Loop, 12 Tex. 11; of criminal con-
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versation: Cox v. Whitfield, 18 Ala. 738; Clarke v. McClelland,
9 Penn. St. 128; of seduction: Brawner v. Sterdevant, 9 Geo.
69; George v. Van Horn, 9 Barb. 523 ; Shafer v. Grimes, 23
Iowa 553; Holliway v. Parker, 23 Hun 71; for negligently
causing death, under Lord CAMPBELL'S Act and the American
statutes thereon: Woodward v. Chicago, &c., .failroad Go., 23
Wis. 400; Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500; for malicious
prosecution: Taney v. Edwards, 27 Tex. 225; against physicians
for malpractice: Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595; for deceit in the
sale or exchange of property: (oker v. Crozier, 5 Ala. 369;
Newsom v. Jackson, 29 Ga. 31; for slander and libel: Long v.
Hitchcock, 3 Ohio 274; Alpin v. Morton, 21 Id. 536; for fraudulently recommending a third party as worthy of credit, whereby
loss was incurred: RHenshaw v. Miller, 17 How. 212; for nuisance:
Blli v. Hansam City, &c., Railroad Co., 63 Mo. 131; Aldrich v.
Howard, 9 R. I. 125; an action against a marshal or sheriff for a
false return: United States v. Daniel, 6 How. 11; Benjamin v.
Smith, 17 Wend. 208; an action of deceit in falsely pretending
that the party was divorced from his wife, whereby the plaintiff was
induced to marry him: Grim v. Carr, 31 Penn. St. 533; Price
v. Price, 18 N. Y. (S. C.) 299; an action of trover: Rench v.
.etzer, 6 S. & R. 272; an action for forcibly seizing a vessel on
the high seas: Nicholson v. Elton, 13 Id. 415; a prosecution for
bastardy: State v. Sullivan, 12 R. I. 212; an action fbr trespass:
Baker v. Danshee, 7 Heisk. 229; an action against a city for
maintaining an excavation in a street into which the plaintiff fell
and was injured: Knox v. City of Sterling, 73 Ill. 214; or an
action against a sheriff for a nonfeasance in neglecting to levy an
execution: Hambly v. Trott, Cowp. 371; Cravatt v. -Plympton,
13 Miass. 454; People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend. 29; all these did not
survive at common law but died with the person.
So also a mandamus against a public officer is regarded as a personal action and abates with the death or retirement of the officer:
United States v. Boutwell, 1 Cent. L. J. 231.
Actions on contract growing out of tort.-It appears to be well
settled in the courts of England that if the executor can show that
damage has accrued to the personal estate of the testator by the
breach of an express or implied promise, he may sustain an action
at common law to recover such damage, although the action is to
some extent founded upon a tort.
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In KYnigkt v. Quailes, 2 B. & B. 102, the plaintiff, as administrator, brought an action of assumpsit, alleging that the defendant
for certain fees to be paid to him by the intestate undertook, as an
attorney, to investigate and see that a title about to be conveyed to
him was a good one. The breach was that he did not do so, whereby
his intestate got a poor title and his personal estate was injured.
The court held that the action survived, saying that it made no difference whether the promise was express or implied, the whole
transaction resting on contract; that though perhaps the intestate
might have brought case or assumpsit the latter was the only remedy
for the administrator. The court further observed that if a man
contracted for a safe conveyance by a coach and sustained an injury
by a fall, by which his means of improving his personal estate were
destroyed, and that property in consequence diminished, though it
was clear that in his lifetime he might sue the coach proprietors in
tort or contract at his election, his executor might sue in assumpsit
for the consequences of'the coach proprietors' breach of contract.
An important dictum to the same effect is found in a case which
arose in the Common Pleas in 1865. A master had brought an
action against a railway company as a carrier of passengers to
recover damages for a personal injury sustained through their negligence by his servant whereby the master lost the benefit of the
services of the servant. The court held that the action would not
lie, because the contract out of which arose the duty to carry safely,
was a contract between the company and the servant. But in the
course of his judgment Mr. Justice WILLES said : "I asked in the
course of the argument, if the executor could sue upon such a contract as this, and Mr. .eane said he thought not. I am disposed
to think the answer given right; it is probably like a promise of
marriage, which not being within the statute of Edw. IV., moritur
cum persona. But suppose the personal estate of the servant sustained injury through the defendant's breach of duty, as if he had
taken a quantity of luggage with him which had been lost or damaged, it is clear his executor might have sued for that damage."
In Bradshaw v. Lancashire,&c.,Railroad Co., L. R., 10 0. P.
189, and Potter v. 1Tfetropolitan, c., Railroad Co., 30 L. T.
(N. S.) 765, the question was considered at length. and expressly
decided.' In the former case a passenger on a railway was injured, and after an interval died in consequence; it was held that
his executrix might recover in an action for breach of contract
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against the railway company, the damage to his personal estate
arising in his lifetime from medical expenses and loss occasioned
by his inability to attend to business. "The ground of action,"
said Mr. Justice GROVE, "is that there has been a breach of a contract made with the testator during his lifetime, whereby in his
lifetime his estate was injured by his having to pay medical and
other expenses and injury to his business, the direct and immediate
consequence of the accident." Similar rulings have been made in
the American courts.
In Miller v. Wilson, 24 Penn. St. 114, the defendant, an
attorney, agreed to draw up a mortgage for the plaintiff and place
it on record. He, however, neglected to record it, and the plaintiff
lost her money by reason of subsequent incumbrances made on the
property. It was held that the action survived the defendant's
death. In Missouri and in the federal courts, it has been held that
an action by a father against a carrier for negligently causing the
death of his child will survive, it being an action for the breach of
a contract: James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162; The City of Brussels,
6 Ben. 370.
Where damage consists only of personal suffering, action on
contract does not survive.-Td the general rule that an action on
a promise express or implied does not abate by death the English
courti have introduced a qualification, viz. : that the action though
based upon an express or implied promise will not survive where
the damage consists entirely in the personal suffering of the
deceased, without any injury to his personal estate: Chamberlain
v. Williamson, 2 M. & S.409, which came before the King's Bench
in 1814, is the leading case of this kind. The action was by the
plaintiff as administrator upon a breach of promise of marriage
made to the intestate in her lifetime. The jury found against the
defendant for 2001. damages. On motion to arrest the judgment
on the ground that the cause of action did not survive to the
administrator, the court took time to consider the question, saying
that it was a case of novelty and importance for which no precedent
could be found in the report. After full consideration judgment
was delivered against the plaintiff. "The general rule of law,"
said Lord ELLENBOROUG1, C. J., is actio personalis moritur curn
persona, under which rule are included all actions for injuries
merely personal. Executors and administrators are the representatives of the temporal property, that is, the debts and goods of the
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deceased, but not of their wrongs except where those wrongs
operate to the temporal injury of their personal estate. But in that
case the special damage ought to be stated on the record, otherwise
the court cannot intend it. If this action be maintainable, then
every action founded on an implied promise to a testator where the
damage subsists in the previous personal suffering of the testator
would be also maintainable by the executor or administrator. All
injuries affecting the life or health of the deceased- all such as
arise out of the unskilfulness of iedical practitioners-the
imprisonment of the party brought on by the negligence of his
attorney-all these would be breaches of'the implied promise by
the persons employed to exhibit a proper portion of skill and attention. We are not aware, however, of any attempt on the part
of the executor or administrator to maintain an action in any such
case." But Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Chamberlain v. Williamson
was careful to say that if there had been anything in the record
to show that any injury had been done to the estate of the deceased
though the breaking of the promise, the result would have been
different.
Personal suffering the only damage.-Tihe American rule.In the American courts the same doctrine as was laid down in
hamberlainv. Williamson is adhered to, and where the damage
consists only of personal suffering, the action will not survive
although it may arise from a breach of a contract. The first cases
illustrating this rule are like 6Ohamberlain v. Williamson, actions
for breach of contracts to marry. In Stebbins v. Palmer, decided
in Massachusetts in 1822, the defendant died while the action of
breach of promise of marriage was pending, and it was held that
the action did not survive. "It is a contract," said' the court,
"merely personal ; at least it does not necessarily affect property.
The principal ground of damages is disappointed hope; the injury
complained of is violated faith, more resembling in substance deceit
and fraud than a mere common breach of promise :" Stebbins v.
Palmer, 1 Pick. 71. The next case arose three years later in
Pennsylvania, the defendant dying pending the action. The same
conclusion was reached. "It cannot be said," said TILGHIMAN, C.
J., "that any injury has been done to the property of the plaintiff, nor is there any measure or standard for regulating the damages.
But the counsel for the-plaintiff rely on the contract in this case and
on some general dicta that all actions founded on contract survive.
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This position is too general. If true, it must extend to contracts
implied as well as expressed. Suppose the case of a physician or
surgeon who by unskilful treatment injures the health of a patient.
Here is a breach of an implied contract; and yet it will hardly be
contended that in case of death the cause of action would survive.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to confine the survivor of action to
cases in which actual property is affected, even though there be an
express contract. A promise of marriage is undoubtedly a contract, though one of a singular nature. By its breach the feelings
of the injured party may be deeply wounded, but it is not perceived that his property is in any manner affected. * * * It
affects the hopes, the feelings, the imagination, the minds of the
parties without touching their property. And whether these hopes
and feelings would have been gratified or disappointed by the fulfilment of the contract, it is beyond the reach of human sagacity
to decide. It is not pretended that in case of slander the action survives. Yet there the mental feelings may be as severely afflicted as
by the loss of marriage. No benefit accrued to the estate of the
defendant by the ibutual promises in this case :" Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 S. & R. 183 ; Wade v. Jfalbfteisch, 58 N. Y. 282, is a
still stronger case for there the survival of the action (also breach
of promise of marriage) was claimed under a statute which provided
that "1actions on contract" should survive. The court refused to
rule that this was an "action upon contract" within the statute.
And that an action for breach of promise of marriage will not survive has been held in Maine: Hov'ey v. Page, 55 Me. 142, and in
New Jersey, 4 Yroom 179. In Best v. TFedder, 58 How. Pr. 187,
it was held that an action against a physician for unskilful treatment did not survive against the defendant's executors. "Pain
and bodily injuries," said the court, " do not possess such transmissible qualities as to compel the living to atone for such as the
dead inflicted, nor to entitle them to receive satisfaction for such as
the dead suffered.
A still more restricted doctrine prevails in the.American courts.
Notwithstanding the dictum of Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in 07tamberlain v. Williamson, that if any special damage had been stated in
the record the action might have been maintained by the administrator for the breach of promise of marriage, it is now generally
held in the United States that where the primary cause of action
dies with the person that which is merely incidental must go with
VOL. XXXI.-46
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it. Thus SHAw, 0. J., in Smith v. Shterman, 4 Cush. 408, ruled
that expenditures made by the promisee by way of preparation for
.the marriage, although in some manner affecting her estate, must
be regarded as merely incidental to the promise to marry, and would
not afford a substantive cause of action or enable the plaintiff to
maintain a suit which otherwise could not be maintained. In Wade
v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282, an action for breach of promise of
marriage, the court said: "The learned counsel suggested that upon
a trial against executors or administrators, the personal elements
of the action may be eliminated and a recovery confined to the
pecuniary loss for support, dower, &c. There is no precedent for
such a proceeding and no principle upon which it could be adopted.
For some purposes where the relation exists, the pecuniary rights
of the wife are estimated and protected by the courts. But what
would be the rule of pecuniary loss hypothetically sustained for
support? Would it be competent to prove the value of the defendant's property ? Such evidence is admitted in this action, not to
prove the pecuniary loss for support, but to show what the station
of the plaintiff in society would have been which is purely a personal grievance and injury. The counsel likened it to an employment for a term of years at a fixed salary, and contract broken by
the employer without cause. If it could be thus transformed it
would be competent to show in defence that the plaintiff had an
opportunity to contract an equally eligible marriage with another
person, and the plea of the want of affinity or affection would not
avail. As to dower there could be no certainty to base a recovery
upon. It would have been competent for the defendant to have
disposed of all real estate before marriage, and all personal estate
before death. Aside from these considerations, suggested to show
the novelty if not the absurdity of such a trial, the brief answer
to this point is that the action is from its peculiar nature indivisible.
If revived at all, it must be revived as an entirety. If its personal
features are abandoned the incidents only remain. The circumstances relative to the property and standing of the defendant are
admissible upon the question of damages, but they are incidental
and subordinate and so complicated with personal injuries as to render their separation impracticable.
In Vittum v. Gilman, 48 N. H. 416, the court having determined
that a cause of action against a physician and surgeon, arising from
want of care or skill in the cure of a patient, did not survive the
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death of the surgeon, it was held that no suit could be maintained
against the executor to recover for increased expenses incurred by
the patient which were merely incidental to the personal injury.
A similar ruling is made in Jenkins v. French, 58 N. H. 532.
The principle of these cases seems to be best summed up by a
New York judge as follows: " In cases of slander, libel, assault
or battery, or false imprisonment, there may be, and usually is,
damage to both the person and the estate. But still the executor could not maintain an action for the injury to the clothes of the
testator in the assault, nor for the money necessarily expended in
his cure, nor for the profits of business or the wages of labor lost
by reason of the slander, the libel, the battery or the imprisonment.
For the gist of the several actions is injury to the person, and the
other matters are mere aggravation of the damages: Pried v. New
York Central Bailroad Co., 25 How. Pr. 287.
On the other hand there are some rulings that are in conflict with
this principle. In Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 S. & R. 188, TILGHMAN, 0. J., while deciding that the injury in that case being merely
personal would not survive, thought that if any damage to the
plaintiff's property had been shown, the result might have been different. In Hfovey v. Page, 55 Me. 142, the court, while ruling
the same way on the facts, said that the "allegation of special damage which would cause the action to survive must be of damage to
the property," but held that an allegation that after the promise of
marriage, the plaintiff's intestate had a child born to her out of
wedlock, of which the defendant was the father, "was insufficient for two reasons-first, because the fact only injured the character of the woman and not her estate, for by statute the father was
liable for the support of a bastard child. In James v. Christy, 18
Mo. 162, it was held that an action by a father against a common
carrier for causing the death of his son, survived the death of the
father, but this reasoning is apparently based on the ground that the
action rested upon a breach of contract obligation, which breach
injured the property rights of the father.
Other English Statutes.-In Troyeross v. Grant, 27 W. R. 87,
it was said by the English Court of Appeal that the statute of
Edward III. had been construed by successive decisions to extend
to all actions except those relating to the freehold or those affecting
the person or reputation of the plaintiff, only such as assault, slander,
breach of promise of marriage; and it was held that whenever the

